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THE RENAISSANCE OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY, THE
NEGATIVE DOCTRINAL FEEDBACK LOOP, AND THE
RISE OF A NEW EXCEPTIONALISM
Sarah Krakof*
Replying to Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431 (2005).

In (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law,' Professor Frickey elegantly describes recent trends in federal Indian law,
and makes a convincing case for the exceptionalism of the field. Professor Frickey's searching analysis of the Justices' various opinions in
United States v. Lara,2 and the ways in which these opinions highlight
the "constitutional crisis" lurking in federal Indian law, is deep and
apt. I also agree with his prescription that the Court should resist the
"seduction of coherence." 3 Cleaning up Indian law in the ways portended by Justices Kennedy or Souter, and in at least one of the ways
suggested by Justice Thomas, in their respective Lara opinions would
do harm to a range of jurisprudential and normative commitments.
Professor Frickey canvasses these commitments thoroughly, and there
is no need to paraphrase his points.4
Instead, I want to sketch out, in an introductory fashion, an idea
about why members of the current Court, who otherwise share relatively little in terms of their jurisprudential or political leanings, appear to be so readily seduced by the same siren. If we accept Professor
Frickey's damning critique of the Court's behavior in federal Indian
law, as I think we should, how do we explain that behavior? This
short Reply to Professor Frickey's article suggests that the Court lacks
an appropriate and realistic vision of American Indian tribes as sovereigns in the modern context. Presented with several fairly unexceptional instances of tribes acting as sovereign governments, the Court
has created a new American Indian law exceptionalism in recent years,
adopting rationales to reject exercises of tribal power on grounds that
are inconsistent with doctrinal and interpretive norms in other fields of
law. This suggestion is not at odds with Professor Frickey's observations that the Court is abandoning the previous form of Indian law exceptionalism in favor of apparent coherence. To the contrary, the
*
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HARV. L. REV. 43I (2005).

2 124 S. Ct. 1628 (2004).

3 Frickey, supra note

i, at 435.
4 See id. at 472-89 (canvassing doctrinal, institutional, and normative "vectors" at stake).
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Court's new exceptionalism merely highlights that the Justices are not,
and cannot be, successful at integrating federal Indian law into other
fields. The Court lurches towards norms that appear to smooth over
American Indian law's frayed edges, only to tear holes in doctrinal and
interpretive fabric elsewhere.
The Court's new exceptionalism is grounded in the erasure of,
rather than the imperfect reconciliation of, the nation's colonial origins. The explanation for this lies, in significant part, in the Court's
unstated skepticism that tribal sovereignty is viable in today's world.
As Professor Frickey points out, there is little to no constitutional basis
for the Court injecting its views into the law in this regard. 5 Yet liberal constitutionalists, such as Justices Ginsburg and Souter, join
hands with textualists/originalists, such as Justices Scalia and Thomas,
to frolic in the common law of diminishing tribal sovereignty A review of the cases suggests that the reason for this rare harmony is a
shared belief that tribal sovereignty dissipated some time ago, and that
what is left instead is an odd form of quasi-municipal government,
and/or highly bureaucratic social club, the powers of which should be
limited to clearly consenting members.
To counter this view, scholars should spend more time describing
the significance and functions of modern American Indian tribal sovereignty, and less time urging the Court to resurrect formalisms that,
as Professor Frickey suggests, never existed. Sovereignty, as a "platonic notion," 6 need not be revived. But sovereignty, as an evolving
experience that is crucial to separate tribal identity, needs to be better
appreciated, explained, and ultimately protected against further jurisprudential colonialism.

If all you know about American Indian law comes from law review
articles or Supreme Court decisions, you could be forgiven for thinking
that American Indian nations must be on their last gasp, barely hanging on to any semblance of self- governance. Yet as Charles Wilkinson
powerfully describes, American Indian nations are now exercising
more sovereignty on the ground than at any point since the early nineteenth century.' The most headline-catching aspect of this sovereignty
renaissance is the Indian gaming industry, but gaming is not the most
impressive aspect of the tribal revival. Of greater significance, Indian

5

Id. at 436 ("In recent years, the Court has injected itself into Indian affairs despite having

an even more inferior constitutional pedigree than Congress has.").
6 See McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
7 See generally CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN
INDIAN NATIONS (2005).
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nations have their own legal systems, are running educational institutions, are managing a variety of social and human services programs,
are engaged in a range of economic development initiatives (including
natural resource based industries, agriculture, tourism, and even
manufacturing and telecommunications), and are reaching out to state
governments as sovereigns to address problems of mutual governmental concern.8
While it would be an overstatement to say that American Indian
nations are flourishing, there is little doubt that they are doing much
better at most governmental functions than they have for many decades, and are consequently better-situated to meet the needs of residents of Indian country, whether tribal members or not. Ironically, the
success of sovereignty-in-action has led to the erosion of the legal doctrine of sovereignty in the Supreme Court. There are (at least) two interrelated reasons for this. First, as tribes started acting more like
modern governments after the first wave of self-determination policies,
they inevitably began to have more legal conflicts with non-Indians.
Second, the overlapping territorial boundaries of tribal and state governments, in combination with the allotment era's legacy of nonIndian land scattered throughout many reservations, has compounded
the Court's confusion about and resistance to a modern version of
tribal sovereignty. As a result, the Court has not been able to integrate
an updated sense of tribal sovereignty into its case law, and therefore
the "conflict with non-Indians" cases have placed enormous negative
pressure on the field, in the ways described by Professor Frickey.9 The
unfortunate outcome is that while tribes have struggled to grow into a
sovereignty that comports with the challenges of their unique status,
the Court has persistently fallen back on a very stunted vision of sovereignty that forces tribes backwards into a dependency that was
never meant to continue indefinitely. 10

8 See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109 (2004) (describing the range of exercises of tribal
sovereignty in the context of a study of the effects of federal Indian law on the Navajo Nation).
9 See Frickey, supra note i, at 452-6o.

10 See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (stating that Indian tribes are
in a "state of pupilage," but also indicating that the "ward-guardian" relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes should not be a permanent situation). Indeed, the thrust of
current self-determination era policies is to perpetuate the government-to-government relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes, but simultaneously to free tribes from the paternalistic and excessively controlling manifestations of that relationship that had characterized
previous policy periods.

See RICHARD NIXON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE

UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc.
No. 91-363 (1970);

see also DAVID H.

GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A.

(5th ed.
some of the many congressional statutes that promote tribal self-determination).
WILLIAMS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221-25

2004) (listing
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A review of some of the same cases that Professor Frickey canvasses in section III.B of his article, in which he describes the unraveling of the modern era model of Indian law," supports the point that
cases involving conflicts with non-Indians dominate the Court's Indian
law agenda. The cases about state authority in Indian country and
tribal authority over nonmembers in Indian country obviously involve
questions of conflict between tribes and non-Indians. 12 Slightly less
obviously, the cases about reservation diminishment also involve such
conflicts. The question whether a reservation has been diminished often arises in the context of the tribe asserting regulatory authority over
non-Indian conduct on lands whose reservation status is in question.13
A quick examination of the tribal activity at issue in some of these
cases reveals the ways in which modern, and arguably run-of-the-mill,
exertions of tribal sovereignty are treated with suspicion by the Court.
In South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 14 the state had approved a
landfill on lands that the tribe considered to be within its jurisdiction
and the tribe attempted to block the landfill. 15 Regulating placement
of landfills, and thereby safeguarding community health standards as
well as enacting the community's norms about trade-offs between
health and economic development, is an activity that in most modern
circumstances falls to the proximate governmental actor. In Yankton,
however, the Court used its diminishment doctrine to shrink the tribe's
jurisdictional land base and deprive it of regulatory authority.

In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,16 the tribes had imposed their own tribal cigarette tax on sales
within their reservations, and had set the tax at a rate lower than that
imposed by Washington State."
The tribal goal of attracting commerce and generating tax revenue was disparaged by the Court as
marketing an exemption from state taxation.' The Court's dismissive
rejection of the tribes' interest in competitive taxing as a way to
attract economic development is an example of the Court's new
exceptionalism.

11See Frickey, supra note

i, at 452-6o.

12 See id. at 454-6o.

13 See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (Igg8) (holding that the state, and
not the tribe, had regulatory jurisdiction over landfill on land determined to be outside of reservation boundaries); Rosebud Sioux Tibe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (rejecting tribe's request for
declaratory judgment that the tribe, not the state, had jurisdiction over contested lands); DeCoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (holding that the state, not the tribe, has civil and
criminal jurisdiction over matters arising on contested lands).
14 522 U.S. 329 (1998).
15Id. at 333.
16 447 U.S. 134, 154-55 (1980).
17 Id. at 141,
18 Id. at 155.

144.
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Professor Frickey points out that the old exceptionalism drives the

conclusions in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission"9 and
Bryan v. Itasca County2 0 that states cannot impose their taxes on tribal
members within Indian country, because "multiple tax burdens - federal, state, sometimes local - are common in America." 21 Yet the
overlapping territorial jurisdiction of tribal and state governments creates tension with other norms of taxation. While it is true that concurrent taxation of some activities, in particular earning income, is common, the same cannot be said for other activities, such as purchasing
consumer goods. There is, to date, no national sales tax, and as a result, states commonly compete with one another for customers by
marketing their lower taxes. 22 Yet the Court rejects similar activity by
Indian nations.23 One plausible message is that tribes should not step
outside of their dependent sovereign boundaries. It is one thing to be
in the business of protecting their hapless members, as in Williams v.
Lee. 2 4 When that is the issue, the tribal interest can rise to the level of
creating a barrier to state jurisdiction. 25 It is quite another to be impinging on the economic prerogatives of states, even when, as the Colville Court conceded, the state's prerogatives have the potential to undermine the tribe's economic development activities.2 6
In the "implicit divestiture" line of cases, the Court has engaged in
other versions of the new exceptionalism. For example, in Strate v.
A-i Contractors,27 the Court, exercising its common law of implicit divestiture of tribal inherent powers, held not only that a state court
might have concurrent jurisdiction over a matter between a nonIndian plaintiff and non-Indian defendants that arises within reservation boundaries - and on land that, until Strate itself, would have
been considered "Indian country" for jurisdictional purposes 28 - but
also that the tribal court lacks such jurisdiction. 29 As Professor

19 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
20 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
21 Frickey, supra note i, at 449.

22 In the tri-state area, for example, it is well-known that New Yorkers will often travel to
New Jersey to shop for consumer goods in order to avoid New York sales taxes.
23 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
24 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that states lack jurisdiction over a suit by a non-Indian plaintiff against tribal member defendants for a cause of action arising within reservation boundaries).
25 See id. at 220.

26 See Colville, 447 U.S. at 151 n.27 ("[T]he tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of
sales to non-Indians, or indeed to any such sales at all.").
27 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining Indian country as "all land within the limits of any
Indian reservation ... including rights-of-way running through" the reservation) Strate, 520 U.S.
at 456 (finding that state right-of-way is "aligned with non-Indian fee land" for purposes of the
Court's jurisdictional analysis).
29 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 442.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

52

[Vot- 119-47

Frickey suggests, the Court was motivated by the "mainstay" norm of
fairness to the "foreign" defendants.30
Yet in its rush to vindicate this norm, it ran roughshod over several
equally powerful norms embedded in doctrines about federal courts
and civil procedure. The Strate Court received only a summary record of the underlying jurisdictional facts, because the defendants
challenged the tribe's jurisdiction in federal court before a full evidentiary hearing was held in the tribal court.3 1 So the Court, on an incomplete record and in derogation of principles of deference to lower
courts regarding factfinding - let alone the "exhaustion doctrine" as
applied to tribal courts3 2 - ruled in apparent furtherance of the norm
Professor Frickey identifies: fairness to foreign defendants.
Had the facts been properly developed, the prominence of other
norms might have emerged, and the strength of the "fairness to the defendant" norm would have receded. First, a prominent civil procedure
norm is to defer to plaintiff's choice of forum. In the absence of a due
process problem, a statute granting removal, or fairly strong evidentiary and/or fairness concerns, courts defer to plaintiff's forum choice.
The plaintiff, Gisela Fredericks, was a non-Indian, but was the widow
of a tribal member, had four children who were tribal members, and
had lived her entire life within the United States as a resident of the
Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.3 3 The tribal forum was obviously
her choice, for reasons that were likely born of a sense of belonging to
the community, as well as convenience. Second, with regard to fairness to the defendant, federal courts regularly address this under the
rubric of the Due Process Clause as applied to personal jurisdiction
analysis. Applying the "minimum contacts" test to the defendants in
Strate, it is evident that it would have been permissible - and therefore "fair," because the minimum contacts/due process test includes a
fairness analysis - to subject them to suit in tribal court. 34 The tribal
forum was not "foreign" to the defendants, except in the sense that

30 Frickey, supra note i, at 458-59.
31 Interview with Strate's attorney, Melody McCoy, Native Am. Rights Fund, in Boulder,
Colo. (Nov. 12, 2005).

32 See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (applying exhaustion doctrine to a
case between a tribal member and a non-Indian defendant residing in a different state); Nat'l
Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tibe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (holding that non-Indian defendants sued in
tribal court must exhaust their tribal court remedies before challenging tribal jurisdiction in federal court).
33 See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and
Tribal Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. If7, 126o (2001).

34 See id. (suggesting that Strate could have turned on personal jurisdiction principles rather
than categorical rules limiting tribal jurisdiction).
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they were not tribal members.35 This factor alone is fetishized by the
Court and elevated to the status of a rule of decision.3 6
In each of these representative cases, the tribe is asserting very unexceptional claims to governmental powers. In addition, one should
keep in mind the political process backdrop that Professor Frickey
emphasizes, which ensures that any abuses of tribal power will be redressed in Congress. Yet the Court, in striving for surface norms of
fairness to states and non-Indians, actually deviates from norms in the
fields of taxation, civil procedure, and federal courts.
The last "new exceptionalist" example that warrants discussion

here is City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.37 In City of Sherrill,
the Court applied the equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and
impossibility to defeat a tribe's claim that it should be free from local
property taxes. The tribe owned the properties in question in fee simple and had purchased them on the open market, but the parcels were
within the original boundaries of the tribe's reservation, and the Supreme Court had earlier held that the tribe's lands had been taken
from it in violation of federal law.38 The tribe therefore argued that by
reacquiring its treaty-guaranteed lands, it united its treaty-based title
with present legal title, and the categorical prohibition on state or local
taxation of tribal property within tribal territory should apply.3 9 As I
discuss elsewhere, the Court could not have found for the City of
Sherrill on the merits without doing serious damage to the Indian law
doctrines of reservation diminishment and state taxation of tribal
property.40 Instead, the Court held that the tribe was barred by hoary
equitable defenses from asserting its sovereignty.

35

See id.
36 Professor Frickey notes that the Court was likely troubled by the absence of a removal statute for nonmember defendants analogous to the provision for removal from state to federal court
found in 28 U.S.C. § 144' (2000 & Supp. II 2002). See Frickey, supra note i, at 459. This is
surely correct. But even the federal removal statute provides an exception for diversity cases in
which the defendant is a citizen of the state in which she has been sued. See 28 U.S.C. § 144i(b).
If Congress were to pass a removal statute applicable to tribal court cases, it is fair to ponder the
question whether a nonmember who has significant ties to the reservation and resides on or
proximate to the reservation should be placed in the same nonremovable situation as the state
citizen defendant. In other words, if the federal removal statute's diversity provision contains
"fairness to defendant" elements, there is every reason to surmise that similar elements will dictate
an analogous tribal removal statute, and that those elements will not necessarily mimic the
Court's evolving "members only" rule.

37

125 S. Ct. 1478 (2005).

38 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
39 See City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1489.
40 See Sarah Krakoff, City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York: A Regretful Postscript to the Taxation Chapter in Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of FederalIndian Law 2005 Edition,
41 TULSA L. REV. (forthcoming Winter 2005) (manuscript at

Law School Library).

05-06, on file with the Harvard
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City of Sherrill is the apex to date in the Court's new exceptionalism in federal Indian law. The Court's application of laches was exceptional in two ways. First, the defense of laches, an affirmative defense susceptible to waiver by the defendant, had likely been waived
by the City of Sherrill due to its failure to raise it either in its petition
for certiorari or its briefs before the Court. 41 Second, a fair examination of the factual and legal backdrop to City of Sherrill reveals that
neither of the core elements of laches, the plaintiff's inaction or the
risk of a remedy's undue disruption, was present. 42 The Oneida Indian Nation had acted with dispatch regarding its claim to be free of
local taxes, and in the longer historical time frame of its land claims,
had consistently pursued all avenues of legal redress as soon as it was
feasible, legally and politically, to do so. 4 3 In terms of disruptiveness,
the remedy sought by the tribe would only have required that the City
of Sherrill stop taxing several parcels of land. No one would have
been ejected from their property The City would not have had to relinquish regulatory or zoning authority over the area. The lower
courts would not be involved in any drawn-out enforcement process.
In short, no disruption would have occurred. 44
City of Sherrill also, not coincidentally, reveals the Court's deep
skepticism about the continuing vitality of tribal sovereignty. To hold
that sovereignty can just dissipate with the passage of time, notwithstanding the perseverance of the tribal governmental entity asserting
it, and that government's very concrete efforts to restore its functions
and its homeland, is puzzling. Where and when did the sovereignty
go? My sense is that the Court's unstated answer is that it is nowhere
to be found because it has been a fiction for decades. Despite the facts
on the ground about what tribal nations are doing and have been doing since the Ig6s, the Court has conceived of them in the same way
that some lower courts did at mid-twentieth century, during the heyday of the termination era.
The Court's apex of new exceptionalism in City of Sherrill is correspondingly a nadir for the legal doctrine of tribal sovereignty. The
Court arrived at City of Sherrill as a result of the logic of its own opinions over the last three decades. The Court created its own "path dependence," following one decision after another down the road of un41 See City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1497 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the probable
waiver of the equitable defenses, and at a minimum the failure to present them properly before
the Court); see also id. at 1490 n.8 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that "[w]e resolve this case
on considerations not discretely identified in the parties' briefs").
42 See Krakoff, supra note 40 (manuscript at 108-13) (analyzing historical and recent facts behind City of Sherrill).
43 See id. (manuscript at 1Io1-3) (discussing the tribe's persistent and timely pursuit of legal
remedies for its land claims violations).
44 See id. (manuscript at II2-13) (describing the absence of disruptiveness of the remedy).
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raveling tribal inherent powers one patch of land at a time, and allowing state regulation one tax at a time. The beleaguered version of
tribal sovereignty that underlies these decisions finally gave way in
City of Sherrill, reduced to ancient "embers" 45 that the Court snuffed
out.
Outside of the Court's chambers, tribal sovereignty burns on. The
Oneida Indian Nation itself is a good example. The Oneidas came
back from the brink of near extinction as a result of an economic development strategy that included gaming. Today, the Oneidas have
several economic enterprises, including their successful casino, a marina, a fishing lodge, gas stations, convenience stores, and automotive
maintenance shops.46 The Oneidas boast that they are the largest employer in Oneida and Madison Counties. 47 In addition, the Oneida
Indian Nation has its own police force, provides educational services
and after-school programs, runs a housing program, and is engaged in
a project to preserve the Oneida language. 4 8
The Supreme Court's vision of tribal sovereignty is sharply at odds
with the facts of tribal sovereignty on the ground. The task for current scholars of federal Indian law is to tell the stories about modern
tribal sovereignty, which inevitably must include some powers over
non-Indians, with the long-range ideal of installing these stories somewhere in the conscience of the federal judiciary, if not now then at
some future point in time. The negative feedback loop of the Court's
encounters with modern Indian nations has to stop somewhere. Or, as
Professor Frickey suggests, the Court should just stop doing federal
Indian law.

45 City of Sherrill, 125 S. Ct. at 1490.
46 See Oneida Nation Enterprises, http://www.onenterprises.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
47 See Oneida Indian Nation, The Nation Next Door, http://www.oneida-nation.net/broi.html
(last visited Jan. 17, 2006).
48 See id.

